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JURISDICTION 
iHiisdi! I inn in infei reil upon the ill <ili 'jUpLwnu.' LOULI Ln IK ar 
t h i s appeal by Sect ion 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( j ) , II., C A, 1953 as amended ( " o r d e r s , 
judgments , and dec rees of any minimi of record over win i ("hi I. In-' nnmirf 
Il Appeals ill «i.;11.; i n Il have UJ ujiiidJI a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n " | . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The i s s u e s on appeal which a rc relPVi'irit" "h" appe l lan t Acoinll riiie 
as f o l l o w s : 
mi Whether I IK-, i i idii cour t p roper ly dismissed p l a i n t i f f ' s 
innmpl «;i in ml iii|ri i list 11 PI i'I-1 mi Mi (in (mi in in I I I in i in I pliiint ill I ' • IJ>,I'1II.' in'n'c 
remedy i s the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e procedure s e t f o r t h in I.Lie coJ l e c t i v e 
b a r g a i n i n g agreement, between UPRR and p l a i n t i f f ' s union, 
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Act preclude state court jurisdiction nt plaintiff's claim. 
I, Whether plaintiff's complaint states a separate state law 
i . t i i i i c nil d e l it in wIIin i ( IIi iiii I I i | i I L i i t a L e l y b t p u i L , i i u n i j n u t a t e c o u r t . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Th i s is i in i in ac t i on to enforce a i \ el: t 1 erne n 1", 
•jpeei Lieaily Lhu Memorandum. Agreemen t da ted September 
settling Acord's Federal Employers Liability Act suit against 
in i. * ~ederal district court, 
The t r la I i M>UI t, «IIIUI.Iqe Scott Daniels, granted 
Respondent/defendanl' UPRR' s Moti < HI I o Dismissif ruling that 
/ P I ri i ivt i I I A r m 11 * w e y e I mt; i \/n j i-^ nuM I • • •  '" "te d d i i i i i ' i l s t i i c t l i » e 
procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement and that 
there was not any separate utate law claim which could be 
1 
legitimately preserved. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Donald F. Acord was injured while working as a 
locomotive engineer for defendant UPRR during June 1979, and, as 
a result of that injury, filed a civil action in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah under the Federal Employers 
Liability Act (FELA). Pursuant to a stipulation and settlement 
agreement between the parties, that action was dismissed. The 
terms of the settlement included a cash payment of $212,500.00 to 
Acord and the Memorandum Agreement dated September 27, 1982 
(hereafter referred to as "Memorandum Agreement") which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A". The Memorandum Agreement provided, in 
essence, that Acord would be allowed to continue his employment 
with UPRR as a fireman (even though he is a qualified Engineer) and 
to take prescribed pain medication (Percodan) while on duty, as 
long as he did not operate the engine unit while using the pain 
medication. From September 27, 1982 until November 4, 1985, Acord 
continued to be employed by UPRR. On November 4, 1985, UPRR 
elected to discontinue its performance under the terms of the 
Memorandum Agreement and notified Acord by letter dated November 
4, 1985, that it was withholding him from further service. The 
reason given by UPRR for discontinuing its performance under the 
Memorandum Agreement was that Acord1 s use of the pain medication 
was proscribed by its internal "operating" rules, specifically, 
rule "G". Plaintiff Acord thereafter brought an "independent 
action" in the United States District Court for the District of 
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Utali to enforce the settlement agreemenl , specifically the terms 
of the "Memorandum Agreement " On April ,'n, l 'i a B
 r ii.fi, l i i / ; l i i r l 
J u d g e III I"-!!"'!.'" in i II "niuiii i |i c in! u d UP11R L M U L I O I I I » d i s m i s s A c o r d " i.i L*jk< l e i a I 
c o u r t a c t i o n fun i risons which inc luded absence of d i v e r s i t y of 
c i t i z e n s h 11» betweoni 1 ho pi n i l •' 111 I I u 11 IIPR R i •. < 11 - i 11< i IIII IIII"," . i 11 il II i 
rut potation I'lai^x^ tiled tins action in State court 
seeking enforcement * • ;eptember _., 1 "Memorandum 
Agreement" Imtwpei 
ARGUMENT 
I. FELA, 45 U.S.C SECTION 55, REBUTS THE EXCLUSIVE 
JURISDICTION PRESUMPTION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR 
ACT AND PROVIDES THE STATE DISTRICT COURT WITH 
JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE FELA SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT. 
A. The FELA, Specifically 45 U.S.C. section 55, Rebuts The 
Exclusive Jurisdiction Presumption Of The Railway Labor, 
Act (RLA), And Provides The District Court With 
Independent Jurisdictional Grounds To Enforce The 
Settlement Agreement Settling Plaintiff Acord's Prior 
FELA Action Against UPRR, Because Plaintiff Acord, In The 
Instant Case, Alleges That The Termination Of His 
Employment With UPRR Violates The Terms Of The Settlement 
Agreement, As Opposed to Alleging That His Dismissal Was 
A "Retaliatory Dismissal" Proscribed By The Collective 
Bargaining Agreement. 
•ir;:: - . r Its Memoranci ipport ini^ 
Lne District. ..v. . . .^ditiiui jui.^  u5 ^ .»r^ empt r/e 
provisions " iz>- Railway uibor Art an:-, th*- Plaintiff ^co^Vs 
ai:b±Lrated : • ;ie admin istralive procedures \:er^ e 
bargaininc agreement] and the [Railway Labor Acu.j ?.->*---J * -
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Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, (hereafter referred to 
as Defendant's Memorandum) at p. 8, (R. 00020). In support of this 
argument Defendant UPRR relied upon Andrews v. Louisville & 
Nashville R, Co, 406 U.S. 320, 32 L.Ed. 2d 95, 92 S.Ct. 1562 (1972) 
and Maanuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F. 2d 1367 (9th Cir. 
1978). Specifically, Defendant UPRR asserts that since Andrews and 
Maanuson "the courts have uniformly looked through the cause of 
action as characterized in the pleadings to the true nature of the 
claim, and have deferred to the jurisdiction the RLA in virtually 
all cases where claims challenging railroad disciplinary actions 
were attempted to be presented in a variety of state common law 
causes of action"; and argued that "such cases, including the case 
at bar, should be carefully distinguished from the circumstances 
and ruling of the recent case of [Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rv. 
Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 107 S.Ct. 1410, (1987)] wherein the 
U.S Supreme Court narrowly held that a workplace dispute which 
might be arbitrated as a grievance under the RLA may also be 
pursued under the FELA where the dispute includes a claim for 
personal injuries based upon railroad negligence." Defendant's 
Memorandum p. 11, fn. 6, (R. 00023). 
Defendant failed, however, to explain how Buell is 
distinguishable from the instant case. In Buell, a railroad carman 
filed an FELA suit in Federal District Court, alleging that 
Atchison had condoned his harassment by fellow employees, causing 
him to suffer an emotional breakdown. Atchison filed an Answer 
asserting, inter alia, that Buell1s sole remedy was before the 
4 
NRAB. Specifically, the railroad argued that "there is no subject 
matter jurisdiction in the district court to entertain an action 
concerning a labor dispute between a xcarrier1 subject to the 
Railway Labor Act and its employees." The district court agreed 
with that argument and granted summary judgment on "the narrow 
question of the availability to an employee covered by the RLA of 
an FELA remedy based on an alleged negligent failure to maintain 
a safe workplace." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
Buell's claims were not arbitrable under the RLA, and that an FELA 
action was therefore not precluded. The Court of Appeals 
additionally declared that a relevant issue was whether a Railroad 
employees!s wholly emotional injury stemming from his railroad 
employment is compensable under FELA even though that issue had 
neither been raised by the parties nor addressed by the District 
Court. The Court of Appeals determined that the FELA authorizes 
recovery for emotional injury, and because of the important role 
the two statutes play in railway labor relations, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rv Co. v. Buell, 
480 U.S. 557, 559-561, 107 S.Ct 1410, 1412-1413, 94 L.Ed 2d. 563, 
569-570 (1987). 
In the Supreme Court the railroad presented a threefold 
argument to support its contention that Buell could not bring an 
FELA action for his injuries. First, it argued that the exclusive 
forum for any dispute arising from workplace conditions is the RLA. 
Second, it argued that even if many workplace injuries are 
actionable under the FELA, emotional injuries should not be 
5 
actionable because of their close relationship to "minor disputes" 
that are to be handled under the RLA. Finally, the railroad 
responded to the issue raised by Court of Appeals and argued that 
the term "injury" as used in FELA, does not include purely 
emotional injury. The Supreme Court rejected the Railroad's first 
two arguments, but refused to address the question whether a purely 
emotional injury is compensable under FELA, since the record had 
never been developed on the exact nature of the allegedly tortious 
activity involved or the extent of the claimed injuries; and since 
the railroad's motion for dismissal or summary judgment was based 
solely on the ground that the employee's exclusive remedy was to 
file an RLA grievance. Buell, 480 U.S. 563-564, 567, 94 L. Ed. 2d 
571, 574. 
Plaintiff Acord herein asserts that contrary to Defendant 
UPRR's contention, the instant case more closely falls within the 
holdings of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct 
1011, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 147 (1947) and Buell, than that of Andrews v. 
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. 320', 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L. 
Ed. 2d 95 (1972) and its progeny. The decisions relied upon by 
Defendant UPRR in support of its contention that Section 55 was 
not intended to provide "independent jurisdictional grounds" are 
distinguishable from the present case in a manner which is damaging 
to defendant's position. Andrews, for example, is distinguishable 
from this case for the reason that the source of the Andrews 
claimed right against wrongful discharge was the collective 
bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court in Andrews stated: 
6 
Here it is conceded by all that the only 
source of petitioner's right not to be 
discharged, and therefore to treat an alleged 
discharge a wrongful one is the collective 
bargaining agreement between the employer and 
the union. Respondent in this case vigorously 
disputes any intent on its part to discharge 
petitioner, and the pleadings indicate that 
the disagreement turns on the extent of 
respondent's obligation to restore petitioner 
to his regular duties following injury in an 
automobile accident. The existence and extent 
of such an obligation in a case such as this 
will depend on the interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement. Thus 
petitioner's claim, and respondent's 
disallowance of it, stem from differing 
interpretations of the collective-bargaining 
agreement...His claim is therefore subject to 
the Act's requirement that it be submitted to 
the Board for adjustment. (Emphasis added.) 
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 324, 32 
L. Ed. 2d 95, 99, supra. 
The Supreme Court in Buell, supra, distinguished Andrews as 
follows: 
It is true that the RLA remedy for the 
resolution of minor disputes is Nin at least 
some situations' exclusive. Andrews v. 
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. U.S. 
320, 325, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 32 L.Ed. 2d 95 
(1972). In Andrews, an employee brought a 
state wrongful discharge claim based sguarely 
on an alleged breach of the collective 
bargaining agreement. We held that Congress 
had intended the RLA dispute resolution 
mechanism to be mandatory for that type of 
dispute, and that courts were therefore 
foreclosed from addressing claims that properly 
arise under the RLA. In this case, by 
contrast, Congress has enacted the FELA to 
serve as the statutory basis for the award of 
damages to employees injured through an 
employee's or co-workers's negligence. 
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 565-566, 
7 
94 L. Ed. 2d 573, supra. 
In the present case plaintiff's right to claim his discharge 
was wrongful does not arise from the collective bargaining 
agreement between the railroad and his union, but rather from the 
special employment or Memorandum Agreement which was executed in 
settlement of plaintiff's prior FELA action against Defendant UPRR. 
Therefore, despite Defendant UPRR's attempt to characterize the 
special employment agreement as a "supplement" to the collective 
bargaining agreement, it should be clear that the rule enunciated 
in Andrews and the cases which followed it do not apply. The 
"special employment agreement" which settled plaintiff's FELA 
action is entirely separate from the collective bargaining 
agreement, and the employment conditions provided therein are 
entirely different from those of the collective bargaining 
agreement. Moreover, they represent specific employment conditions 
which were negotiated between Plaintiff Acord and Defendant UPRR 
in settlement of that action against UPRR, and not between the 
defendant UPRR and the union. The agreement applied to no other 
UPRR employee than Plaintiff Acord. 
It is therefore clear that UPRR's obligation toward Plaintiff 
arises from the special "Memorandum Agreement" of employment which 
was delivered as consideration for the settlement of plaintiff's 
FELA action, and not from the collective bargaining agreement 
between the union and UPRR. 
There is persuasive case law which holds that in such 
situations as this, where a separate statutory scheme such as the 
8 
FELA conflicts with the RLA, the interaction of the two federal 
statutory schemes rebuts the exclusive jurisdiction presumption of 
the RLA. The Sixth Circuit, in McCall v. Chesapeake & Ry. Co., 844 
F.2d 294, at 298-299 (6th Cir. 1988) recently distinguished the 
Buell and Alexander line of cases from the Andrews line of cases 
relied upon by defendant UPRR in support of its contention that the 
state district court lacks jurisdiction because of the preemptive 
provisions of the RLA. That line of cases involved Maanuson v. 
Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (1978); one of the 
decisions upon which defendant relies. In McCall the two lines of 
decisions are addressed by the court as follows: 
Atchison, T. & S.F. Rv. v. Buell, —U.S.—, 107 S.Ct. 
1410, 94 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1987) is also pertinent. In 
Buell, the Court held that a railroad employee is 
entitled to bring suit under the Federal Employers 
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. Section 51 et. seq., even 
if the employee had the opportunity to pursue a labor 
grievance under the Railway Labor Act. The Court stated: 
xThis Court has, on numerous occasions, 
declined to hold that individual employees are, 
because of the availability of arbitration, 
barred from bringing claims under federal 
statutes. See e.g., McDonald v. West Branch, 
466 U.S. 284, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 
(1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight 
System, Inc. , 450 U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 
L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co. , 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 
(1974). Although the analysis of the question 
under each statute is quite distinct, the 
theory running through these cases is that 
notwithstanding the strong policies encouraging 
arbitration, "different considerations apply 
where the employee's claim is based on rights 
arising out of a statute designed to provide 
minimum substantive guarantees to individual 
workers." Barrentine, supra, 450 U.S. at 737, 
101 S.Ct. at 1443. • 
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Although Buell stands for the proposition that claims 
under substantive statutory rights may be decided outside 
of the labor arbitration machinery, it should not be read 
to overrule our decision in Stephens or to dictate a 
holding in this case that the state act is preempted. 
FELA, the statute involved in Buell, is a federal 
statute. Likewise, the statutes in the cases cited by 
the Court were all federal statutes. Barrentine, 450 
U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437, involved a Fair Labor Standards 
Act claim. McDonald, 466 U.S. 284, 104 S.Ct. 1799, was 
an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Gardner-Denver, 
415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, was a Title VII case. In the 
instant case we are concerned with a state statute. The 
issue is not the relationship between two federal 
statutes passed by congress; it is the relationship 
between a federal statute and a state statute. 
In Stephens we anticipated the result in Buell. 
Footnote 8 of the Stephens opinion pointed out that the 
case involved a conflict between a state statute and a 
federal statute, rather than a conflict between two 
federal statutes. We noted that precedent in other 
circuits supported the proposition that the interaction 
of two federal statutory schemes rebuts the exclusive 
jurisdiction presumption of the railway act. It is that 
proposition that the Supreme Court later adopted in 
Buell. McCaJJL, supra (original emphasis) 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Jackson v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 717 F. 2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1983) distinguished its 
holding in that case from the Alexander and Buell line of cases, 
because plaintiff's cause of action in that case was grounded in 
a state cause of action and "only federal rights have been held, 
under cases such as Barrentine, Hendly, Conrad, and Johnson, to 
rebut the preemption of the RLA." See Jackson, supra at 1051. In 
Jackson, a railroad worker was injured on the job and sued the 
railroad (Conrail) under FELA. After Conrail fired Jackson, he 
later amended his complaint to add a pendent claim that the 
railroad, in violation of his rights under Indiana tort law, had 
fired him because he had filed his FELA suit. The district court 
10 
awarded Jackson $13,500 I n compensatory damages on the FELA claim, 
$182,000 compensatory damages on the retaliatory discharge claim, 
and $1, 260 ,000 pun :i tive damages. Tl: le Coi in : t: of Appeals reversed :ii n 
part the decision of the district court, and held that because 
Jackson's claun tlluit \ui w<is il i schai qptl in iHiilint inn f'oi f i I i nq 
an FELA action was identical to the claim he would have made if he 
had pursued the grievance thorough administrative channels, the 
potential interfei enr*» wi I li fedetal leijulatot "y iiil erest.s was toe 
great to permit an exception to the RLA preemption doctrine, and 
therefore Jackson!s state tort remedy was preempted by the Railway 
preemption was to divest the district court subject matter 
jurisdiction over Jackson's pendent claim, Finally, the Court of 
damage award to Jackson. It should be noted that in Jackson 
the FELA and speci ficalT- 4J U.S.C. Section 55 was on] y indirectly 
relied upon by Jackson +*^  support his clai m that the federal 
com ; ?s jurisdiction was ;.*•*; preempted by the RLA. This is because 
i ; i • i scharge "r e tall i ator y" d i sc 
would the discharge *. late the FELAfs underlying pol.jy 
considerations, it would be expressly proscribed by the collective 
batgdin i rig imreemen t: Il, n I ln-'i word,1-"! Inrksr .i,l w Ihi 1 in  I I 11 b<» 
discharged w:i 1 3 I: ] Conrail or subj ect ; *. ' retaliatory" 
dismissal arose oiit of the collective bargaining agreement, and the 
f a c t t h a t I l ie p u I :ii c,i c i , uinJei1 1 y » ny 1.1 JI; IKK I .A w* >i i • i in " i t i e i t L j 1 1 y .iiiinJI 
indirectly implicated by the alleged "retaliatory" dismissal was 
not, in the Jackson court's opinion, sufficient to rebut the RLA's 
preemption provisions. The Jackson court therefore distinguished 
Jackson's retaliatory discharge claim from cases which directly 
involve a separate conflicting statutory scheme as follows: 
The present case is distinguishable from Barrentine, 
Conrad, and Johnson because neither the FELA, the RLA, 
nor any other federal statute specifically provides a 
right of action to one discharged under the circumstances 
alleged by Jackson. The question is whether the state 
tort action for retaliatory discharge buttressed by the 
policies underlying the FELA, is sufficiently analogous 
to a federal statutory right to rebut the preemption of 
the RLA. 
Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp.f 111 F. 2d at 1050, supra. 
Implicit in the quoted language of Jackson is that a "state 
tort action for retaliatory discharge buttressed by the policies 
underlying the FELA," can, in some cases, be sufficiently analogous 
to a federal statutory right to rebut the preemption of the RLA. 
Plaintiff Acord asserts that the instant case is distinguished from 
Jackson for the reason that Acord's dismissal by the railroad in 
violation of the agreement settling his prior FELA action directly 
implicates and violates the express statutory provisions of the 
FELA and specifically 45 U.S.C. Section 55. In relevant part the 
statute provides: 
"Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, 
the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any 
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability 
created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void." 
Plaintiff's current action is based upon this specific federal 
statutory section because the railroad, by dismissing Acord in 
violation of the FELA settlement agreement exempts itself from 
12 
liability created under the act. Such a self-created exemption is 
legally voic o matter what device has been employed create I t. 
T l i e t - ] mi i n ) i n i i j i l i f i ' M ? I,lllii,11 iKKI in i I In 1IU.A .iggests 
that a plaintiff must resor t to the : to realize the 
consideration agreed upon as the settlement resolution of an 
F'blLA action. Assuming for the purpose «i
 i r g U m e i ^ c: ^  _;tj ff «s 
claim arises solely from a state law action for breach of the 
settlement agreement, the obvious argument j s that the s tate 
action is sufficiently buttressed by poli cies underlying the FEI .A 
to make it analogous to a federal statutory right. This argument 
f :i ncis s u p p o r t i i it I 11H C Ihv 1 < 11r; 11 f f ei:eni Hs I »ef; wHen Jackson and t 11e 
instant case Jackson was able to vindicate hi s rights and pursue 
his remedies under the arbitration process provided by n* - A 
retaliatory dismissals . a; n fact, the RLA was enacted :oi *.e 
purpose of resolving those types o: disputes. ' n ~n ; e 
which he bargained in settling and dismissing his FELA action. 
Plaintiff•s case falls within the rationale of Alexander i r 
Gardner-Denver Co. , «i I"« 11 l •' f i»r " "I ". i I 1111II 3 9 I , Ed 1 17 
(1947) as opposed ' ,; z h e rule stated in Andrews, cited above 
lllii Alexander the petitioner, a black, f:i ] ed a gr i evance under 
the collective bargaining agreement following discharge which 
resulted from racial discrimination. Upon rejection by the company 
which Alexander t u e c ^ M I U . i iiscriminatioL uomplain>. v» U; rre 
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Colorado Civil Rights Commission which was referred to the EEOC. 
The arbitrator ruled that Alexander's discharge was for cause. 
Following the EEOC's subsequent determination that there was not 
a reasonable ground to believe that a violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights had occurred, Alexander brought an action in federal 
district court alleging that his discharge was racially motivated. 
The district court granted the railroad's motion for summary 
judgment and found that Alexander was bound by the prior 
arbitration decision and had no right to sue under Title VII. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed. The case was then appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court where the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals was reversed. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that by 
merely resorting to the arbitral forum, Alexander did not waive his 
cause of action under Title VII and that the rights conferred 
thereby could not be prospectively waived and formed no part of the 
collective bargaining process. The Supreme Court held that "the 
distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory 
rights is not vitiated because both were violated as a result of 
the same factual occurrence." Alexander/ supra, 94 S.Ct. at 1020. 
A key factor in the Supreme Court's reversal of the Court of 
Appeals in Alexander, was the Court's determination that where the 
collective bargaining agreement conflicted with Title VII, the 
arbitrator must follow the agreement. The Supreme Court reasoned 
as follows: 
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution 
of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively 
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights 
created by Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the 
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special role of the arbitrator, whose task is to 
effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the 
requirements of enacted legislation. Where the 
collective-bargaining agreement conflicts with Title VII, 
the arbitrator must follow the agreement. To be sure, 
the tension between contractual and statutory objectives 
may be mitigated where a collective-bargaining agreement 
contains provisions facially similar to those of Title 
VII. But other facts may still render arbitral processes 
comparatively inferior to judicial processes in the 
protection of Title VII rights. Among these is the fact 
that the specialized competence of arbitrators pertains 
primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the 
land...Parties usually chose an arbitrator because they 
trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands 
and norms of industrial relations. On the other hand, 
the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is 
a primary responsibility of the courts... 
Moreover, the fact finding process in arbitration 
usually is not equivalent to judicial fact finding. The 
record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; 
the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and 
procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, 
compulsory process, cross-examination and testimony under 
oath, are often severely limited or unavailable...And as 
this Court has recognized [arbitrators have no 
obligation to give their reasons for an award." [Cites 
omitted] [Emphasis added] 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 94 S.Ct. a I 1011,at 
Id.4 , supra. 
The instant case " clearly analogous to Alexander , and 
distinguishable from Jackson, for the reason that the arbitrator 
in -;_s case woul d hp required il iniiuw I lie | u nv 11.11 UL: • 11 n i 
restrictions contained in thfe collective bargaining agreement over 
the ri ghts and working conditions provided plaintiff by the 
Memorandum Agreement, In Jackson, the p. , was not preji idle ed 
by having resort to the arbitration proceedings since his 
penctenl: r\ = ci n ip • : ii at, i i t u I idl nry dismissal prnhi.ln I eci 
under the collective bargaining agreement. There the FELA was only 
indirectly implicated in the dispute, and "the claim raised by 
Jackson was identical to the claim he would have made, had he 
pursued the grievance through administrative channels." See 
Jackson, supra, at 1054. In other words, it was at least possible 
for Jackson to receive the appropriate relief by resorting to the 
arbitration procedures provided by the RLA. In the present case 
however, an arbitration board could not possibly grant Acord the 
relief he seeks, since the board would be required to follow the 
collective bargaining agreement over Acord!s settlement or 
Memorandum Agreement with the railroad. Plaintiff's claim has 
nothing to do with the collective bargaining agreement. 
Moreover, the Jackson court recognized that not every dispute 
involving a carrier subject to the RLA is preempted. Jackson's 
second argument urged that the outrageous conduct of Conrail 
required recognition of an exception to the preemption doctrine in 
his case as it did in Farmer v. Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 
2£, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1977) and Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 
436 U.S. 180, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 56 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). The Jackson 
court examined Farmer and Sears as follows: 
In both Farmer and Sears the, Supreme Court held that 
state claims were cognizable because there were not 
preempted by the federal labor laws. 
In Farmer, the Court held that a California state court 
could exercise jurisdiction over the claim of a local 
union officer alleging intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Hill, the petitioner's decedent, 
had alleged that, as a result of disagreement with other 
union officials, he was subjected to a campaign of 
ridicule and personal abuse and was discriminated against 
by the union hiring hall. After reviewing exceptions to 
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the preemption doctrine recognized in earlier cases, 
Farmer, 430 U.S. at 295-97, 97 S.Ct. at 1060-61, the 
court stated that one must determine the scope of the 
general preemption rule "by examining the state interests 
in regulation the conduct in question and the potential 
for interference with the federal regulatory scheme." 
Id. at 297, 97 S.Ct. at 1061. 
In applying this test to Hillfs claim the Court fir st 
noted that the state had a substantial interest in 
protecting it citizens from the alleged outrageous 
conduct. Id. at 302, 97 S.Ct. at 1064. The court 
recognized that, because the abusive conduct was 
intertwined wi th allegations of hiring hal 1 
discrimination, there was some potential that Hill's 
state claim would touch on areas generally within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB). The potential interference did not 
overcome the state's interest, however, because 
resolution of the state tort suit turned on whether the 
union's actions had caused Hill severe emotional distress 
whereas the focus of an unfair labor practice inquiry 
would have been on whether the union's conduct 
discriminated against Hill in terms of employment 
opportunities. As a result, the tort action could be 
resolved "without reference to any accommodation of the 
special interests of unions and members in the hiring 
hall context." Id. at 305, 97 S.Ct. at 1066 
Similarly, in Sears, the Court held that Sears could 
rely on state trespass laws in seeking an injunction 
against union picketing on its private property. As in 
Farmer, the primary focus of the Sears Court was on 
whether recognition of the state trespass law would 
interfere with the federal regulatory scheme. The Court 
stated: 
IJI^ Q critical inquiry, therefore, is not 
whether the State is enforcing a law relating 
specifically to labor relations or one of 
general application but whether the controversy 
presented to the state court is identical (as 
in (Garner) or different from (as in Farmer) 
that which could have been, but was not, 
presented to the Labor Board. 
iu, 4oo U.D. au xy/, yd S.C t. ai ±/o/. Applying this 
test to the facts presented in Sears, the Court found 
that the focus of the state trespass proceeding would be 
on where the picketing occurred - private property -
whereas the focus of an unfair labor practice proceeding 
would have been on the objective of the picketing. Id. 
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at 198, 98 S.Ct. at 1758. 
Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., at 1051-52, supra. 
The Jackson Court's comments concerning the holdings in Sears 
and Farmer find equal application here. As in Sears, the same 
matrix of facts could give rise to both a state cause of action and 
a cause of action which would trigger the preemptive provisions of 
a federal act, in this case the RLA. For instance, if Acord had 
alleged that his dismissal was a retaliatory dismissal instead of 
alleging, as he did, that his dismissal was a violation of the 
settlement agreement settling his prior FELA action against UPRR, 
there is no question that his action would be preempted. The fact 
that this case concerns the termination of Acord1s employment with 
the railroad is somewhat misleading, because Acord is seeking to 
enforce his rights under the FELA settlement agreement which he 
directly negotiated with the railroad, and not his rights under the 
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by and between the union 
and the railroad. The possibility that this case may necessitate, 
as a collateral matter, some interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement does not trigger the preemptive provisions of 
the RLA. See, for example, Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 487 
F. Supp. 1343 at 1346 (N.D. Tx. 1980) wherein the district court 
distinguished that case from Andrews, and Maanuson, inter alia, as 
follows: 
The thrust of plaintiffs1 complaint in this case, 
however, is not a contract right, but the right not to 
suffer from discrimination based on age. The fact that 
this determination may necessitate, as a collateral 
matter, the interpretation of a collective bargaining 
agreement does not require that plaintiffs pursue the 
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union grievance procedure prior to bringing their ADEA 
claim. 
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff submits that the 
interaction with uie r" ,' a separate conflicting federal scheme, 
j n thl s ca-^p tbp . ;.; . rebuts the excl usive jurisdiction 
presumption <•: uv; «...- The possibility that determination of th :i s 
case ma} nea.h-.i; ;,., . ol lafera! innf t PI i ntnrprptat ion of the 
collective bargaining agreement does not require that plaintiff 
exhaust his RLA arbitration remedies before pursuing his claim for 
enforcement" nIL J!L" < "™" * .settle ' greernent" ,nl " Irih-' ciiist m i : 
court does have tut requisite urisdiction enforce that 
agreement. 
i 8 u s c S E C T I 0 N 3 4 1 E T S E Q # D 0 E S N 0 T 
PROVIDE DEFENDANT UPRR WITH AN 
ILLEGALITY DEFENSE-
18 U.S,C, Section 341 Et. Sea, , Which Prohibits 
Anyone Under the Influence of Alcohol Or Drugs 
From Operating, Or Directing The Operation Of 
A Common Carrier, Does Not Preclude UPRR From 
Performing According To The Terms Of The 
Memorandum Agreement Settling Acord's Prior 
FELA Action Against UPRR Because The Memorandum 
Provides That Plaintiff Shall Not Operate the 
Engine Unit While Using Percodan, And Because 
Acord, As A Fireman Does Not And Cannot Direct 
The Operation Of The Engine, 
] 8 IJ S C Sect:i c n 3 11 • = • I: seq w. i idd (M1 I |-111 - \ ede ra 1 
criminal code as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Public 
Law, 99 -570 I t creates a new felony c: operating or directing 
1 • I in e c i p e r a t :i c • n c f a z: JIMIO n c: a i: i: :i e i: w I i f 1 u e 11 c L Il 
alcohol or dr ugs. Defendant, j n its Memorandum i n Support 
Motion to Dismiss, (R. 00029-00031), relied upon the new enactment 
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as support for the argument that it is precluded by federal law 
from performing according to the terms of the September 27, 1982 
Memorandum Agreement and is therefore excused from performance. 
The relevant language of the statute, found in Section 342, does 
not support defendant's UPRR's contention. Section 342 provides: 
Whoever operates or directs the operation of a common 
carrier while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
shall be imprisoned not more than five years or fined 
not more than $10,000, or both. (Emphasis added.) 
The Memorandum Agreement, at page 2, provides: 
Engineer Acord shall not operate the engine unit while 
using such medication. (Emphasis added.) 
The Memorandum Agreement therefore provides by its plain 
language that plaintiff shall not operate the engine unit while 
using the pain medication. As a fireman he does not and cannot 
"direct the operation" of the engine. Thus, defendant UPRRfs 
reliance upon Section 341 et seq. is misplaced. Neither the 
statute nor any regulation promulgated thereunder, renders the 
Memorandum Agreement void or unenforceable as claimed. 
Assuming arguendo that some interpretation of the statute or 
the agreement might possibly render the Memorandum Agreement 
unenforceable, there are factual questions that cannot be resolved 
on motion. Section 343 creates a presumption that a person is 
under the influence of a drug if the "quantity of the drug in the 
system of the individual would be sufficient to impair the 
perception, mental processes, or motor functions of the average 
individual". There is nothing in the Memorandum Agreement which 
requires Acord to take the pain medication at all, let alone in 
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quantities that would impair his perception, mental processes or 
motor functions; nor is there any evidence in the record that 
plaintiff would be impaired or perform his duties in an unsafe 
manner while using his prescribed pain medication (Percodan) in the 
prescribed doses. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Percodan was prescribed 
for control of Acord's pain by the defendant's own physician in 
advance of the Memorandum Agreement. This drug was prescribed 
because Acord was allergic to codeine compounds. (Deposition of 
Dr. McKinney, Civil No. C81-0297J). According to the defendant's 
own statement in the November 25, 1985 letter from J.R. Hart to 
plaintiff Acord's attorney, Anthony M. Thurber, Exhibit "B", (R. 
00055), Acord's removal from service was based upon the judgment 
of UPRR's physicians, and not upon any federal law or regulation 
as is now claimed: 
As clarification, Mr. Acord was not removed from service 
because of federal regulation. He was removed from 
service based upon the judgment of company doctors. 
It was the company doctors who prescribed the Percodan which 
Acord was taking at the time of the Memorandum Agreement and at 
the time of his removal from service. The company doctors not only 
prescribed the medication, but continued to renew the prescription 
after the Memorandum Agreement was executed and until Acord's 
removal from service. According to UPRR, it relied upon the 
judgment of these same doctors as the basis for Acord's removal 
from service. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's argument is summarized as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's action is to enforce a contractual employment 
agreement given by defendant UPRR as partial consideration for a 
negotiated settlement of plaintiff's FELA claim, and does not 
involve or arise from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 
between the defendant UPRR and plaintiff's union. The pre-emptive 
provisions of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) for that reason do not 
apply to plaintiff's claim. The state district court accordingly 
has an independent jurisdictional basis to enforce the private 
employment agreement between the parties without regard to the 
procedures required by the RLA for enforcement of a CBA. The 
parties' agreement is in that respect no different than any other 
contract between private citizens subject to state court 
jurisdiction. 
Under applicable federal decisions the interaction with the 
RLA of a separate conflicting statutory scheme, in this case the 
FELA, rebuts the exclusive remedy presumption of the RLA. Without 
that pre-emption, plaintiff's claim is actionable in state court 
as any other private contract. 
2. Defendant's illegality defense is not viable because the 
subject agreement precludes plaintiff from operating an engine 
while using Percodan, and as a Fireman plaintiff cannot and does 
not direct the operation of the engine. 
3. A fact issue precluding summary judgment exists concerning 
whether medication at the prescribed levels would be "sufficient 
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to impair the perception, mental process or motor functions of the 
average individual", even assuming that a defense of illegality is 
available. 
4. Defendant's own physicians prescribed the medication 
Percodan both before and after the parties' Memorandum Agreement 
and decided upon plaintiff's removal from service because he took 
the medication. Under those circumstances it appears that 
defendant UPRR simply decided against further performance under the 
agreement. Such conduct constitutes a "device" enabling a carrier 
to exempt itself from FELA liability which is made void by federal 
law (45 U.S.C. Section 55). 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's action 
for enforcement of the Memorandum Agreement should be maintainable 
in state court. The District Court's dismissal of the action on 
jurisdictional grounds constitutes error and should be reversed. 
DATED this - 7 ^ daY o f August, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Anthony M. Thurber ^^=u^-
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief, 
postage prepaid, this 2ff day of August, 1990 to the following: 
J. Clare Williams 
Larry A. Gantenbein 
Attorneys for Defendant 
406 West 100 South 
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(Donald F. Acord) 
Locomotive Engineer DONALD F. ACORD, Salt Lak-e City, 
has an engineer's seniority date of May 19, 1975, and fireman's 
seniority date of July 1, 1974, 
This man has a history of a job related injury occur-
ring in June, 1979, while working in his routine employment as 
a Locomotive Engineer. He now has difficulty sitting for pro-
longed periods of time due to pain in his low back and in 
performing certain other duties of an engineer and fireman. 
Union Pacific's Medical Director has reviewed the 
medical history of Mr, Acord and has medically released him to 
perform (as his ' seniority permits), the duties of an engineer 
or fireman, insofar as such duties will allow him to stand, 
twist, and bend to s^ret^h b^ .ok and lee muscles sufficicntlv 
to alleviate any pain and discomfort as the need arises. 
Mr. Accra's personal physician has advised that Mr. Acord 
should avoid lifting, pulling or otherwise exerting forces in 
excess of forty (40) pounds, and that it is appropriate that 
Mr. Acord take pain medications as necessary. 
In order to minimize Mr. Acord's physical discomfort 
and provide him continued railroad employment in his craft (to 
the extent his seniority will permit), it has been proposed that 
Engineer Acord be tamoorarily ex^Tpt from ^,n^ 1 abcr contract 
requirement to remain on the engineers' working list whenever 
his seniority will permit, and that he be permitted instead to 
exercise his - fireman's seniority on "must-fill" and other fireman 
assignments as agreed to below. 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS AGREED: 
While this Agreement is in effect, Engineer Donald F. 
Acord shall be released from performing service as a Locomotive 
Engineer to which he may be entitled by his Engineer's seniority, 
during which time he shall be permitted to perform service as a 
Fireman on any "must-fill" road freight or passenger assignment, 
or displace any junior fireman wcrkincr a biankabie assignr.ent in 
accordance with his fireman's seniority, so long as a junior 
fireman can hold such assignment. In the event no junior 
fireman can hold a biankabie assignment, he must displace a 
junior fireman on a "must-fill" road freight or passenger assign-
ment. In the event such "must-fill" fireman assignment in road 
freight cr passenger service is not available, or he exhausts 
his fireman's seniority on such "must fill" assignments, he may 
then exercise his fireman's seniority' to any available road 
freight, yard or hostler assignment, subject to the conditions 
hereinafter set forth. 
Engineer Acord shall net be required to lift or pull 
anything requiring forces to be exerted in excess of twenty-five 
(2 5) pounds while performing work in accordance with the terms 
of this Acreement. 
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(Donald P. Acord) 
Engineer Acord, while working as fireman, shall be 
allowed to take his pain medication as may be necessary while 
on duty- Engineer Acord shall not operate the engine unit 
while using such medication. 
While on duty, Engineer Acord shall be allowed to 
stand, twist, and bend to stretch his back and leg muscles as 
necessary to alleviate his back discomfort. 
Engineer Acord shall not be force-assigned to other 
assignments while working as a fireman on "must-fill" or AiMTRAK 
assignments. 
The conditions set forth above shall continue in effect 
until such time Donald F. Acord's condition improves sufficiently 
to enable him to again resume service as a Locomotive Engineer 
in accordance with his seniority, in which case and at which 
time this Agreement shall automatically terminate. 
Dated this %ljhlday of _^^f^ 1982 
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS 
3 .7 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
'• 4- I 
General Chairma'r 0 
J&Z2LL 
SenTesIr Director of Labor Relations 
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION (E) 
Gene ral /Ch*a"irmaii" Q x 
'0 General Manager 
Engineer Donald F. Acord 
EXHIBIT "B" 
November 25, 1985 
PR-013 (D. F. AcordK^" 
Mr. Anthony M. Thurber 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 735, Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Mr. Thurber: 
This refers to your letter dated November 12, 
1985 concerning fixture-fireman Donald F. Acord. 
Contrary to your assertions, withdrawal of 
Fireman Acord from service does not violate the terms 
of the Labor Agreement under which he was working as a 
fixture-fireman. That Agreement permits Fireman Acord 
to use pain medication as necessary but does not give 
him a license to use as pain medication drugs which 
render him unfit for service. All the Company wants is 
for Mr. Acord to discontinue use of Percodan, which 
according to our doctors is not acceptable, and to 
substitute in its place some other acceptable pain 
medication. 
As clarification, Mr. Acord was not removed 
from service because of federal regulations. He was 
removed from service based on the judgement of Company 
doctors. 
If Mr. Acord feels that his rights under the 
controlling Labor Agreement (i.e., the Agreement under 
which he is restricted to service as a fireman) have 
been violated, he should handle the matter through his 
Labor Union as a grievance. 
Yours truly, 
Original Signed 
J. R. Hart 
cc: Mr. A. W. Rees 
Mr. R. L. Jones 
ACH/K/1125/M 
ADDENDUM 
J. CLARE WILLIAMS, #3490 
LARRY A. GANTENBEIN, #4576 
Attorneys for Defendant 
406 West First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 595-3270 
IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD F. ACORD, ) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
Plaintiff, ) TO DISMISS 
v. 
) 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, ) Civil No. C-88-5848 
Judge Scott Daniels 
Defendant. ) 
Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion to 
Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction having been 
submitted to the Court for decision in accordance with Rule 4-501 
of the Court's Rules of Practice, and the Court having considered 
the arguments and positions of the parties as submitted through 
supporting memoranda, affidavits and other documentary evidence, 
and having been fully advised and informed in the premises and 
having entered its "Minute Entry" dated November 28, 1989, 
ordering that said Motion to Dismiss be granted, makes the 
following ruling and order: 
The Court rules that plaintiff's exclusive remedy with 
respect to the claims set forth in his complaint is an 
administrative one as described in his collective bargaining 
agreement, and that plaintiff's complaint does not state a 
separate state law cause of action which can legitimately be 
pursued in this Court. 
Accordingly, since the Court does not have jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that said complaint be dismissed, as a 
matter of law and with prejudice, each party to bear their own 
costs and expenses. 
DATED this iD day of December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
lonorable Scott Daniels 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the day of December, 
1989, I served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion to Dismiss upon: 
Anthony M. Thurber, Esq. 
8 East Broadway, #735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Secretary/ J w 
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